“States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as well as in the long term, because if a state looses in the short term, it might not be around for the long haul.”
(Mearsheimer, 2001:33)
“Given this gloomy picture, the obvious question is, why are we not all dead? Or, to put it less starkly, what kinds of variables ameliorate the impact of anarchy and the security dilemma?”
(Jervis,1978:6)
At the heart of the fundamental problem of communication between states is what is known as “the Other Minds problem” (Hollis and Smith, 1990:171-6), meaning the inability of state actors to read the minds of their adversaries, therefore making it extremely difficult to trust them, or interpret their ambiguous military behaviour as anything other than threatening. This dilemma of ‘interpretation and response’ is generally referred to as ’the Security Dilemma’ within the academy (Hertz,1951:16).
Recent events in the realm of international politics, however, most significantly the lead up to and the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, has initiate a new exploration into the subject of international communication, and new possibilities for the solving of the ‘other minds’ problem, for the clarification of symbolism and the successful signalling of type, despite the inescapable problem of future uncertainty.
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